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Abstract
As of March 2016, 4.8 million Syrian refugees were scattered in two dozen countries by the civil war. Refugee smuggling
has been a major catalyst of human trafficking in the Middle East and Europe migrant crises. Data on the extent to which
smuggling devolved into trafficking in this refugee wave is, however, scarce. This article investigates how Syrian refugees
interact with smugglers, shedding light on how human smuggling and human trafficking interrelated on the Balkan Route.
I rely on original evidence from in-depth interviews (n = 123) and surveys (n = 100) with Syrian refugees in Jordan, Turkey,
Greece, Serbia, and Germany; as well as ethnographic observations in thirty-five refugee camps or other sites in these
countries. I argue that most smugglers functioned as guides, informants, and allies in understudied ways—thus refugee
perceptions diverge dramatically from government policy assumptions. I conclude with a recommendation for a targeted
advice policy that would acknowledge the reality of migrant-smuggler relations, and more effectively curb trafficking in-
stead of endangering refugees.
Keywords
anti-smuggling; anti-trafficking; asylum; Balkan Route; forced migration; migrants; refugees; Syrian; smuggling; trafficking
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Perspectives on Human Trafficking andModern Forms of Slavery”, edited by Siddharth Kara
(Harvard Kennedy School, USA).
© 2017 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
The Syrian refugee wave on the Balkan Route in
2014–2016 has rekindled interest in the intersection
of trafficking with migrant smuggling. Not only has
the transnational human smuggling operation stretch-
ing from Turkey and the Middle East to Western Eu-
rope transported over a million people in less than 18
months; but government anti-trafficking efforts have
failed to effectively isolate traffickers thriving within the
broader category of smugglers. Indeed, smuggler bribes
and patron-client arrangements have infiltrated state or-
gans to such a dramatic extent (Reitano, 2015) thatmany
traffickers operate with impunity while low-level smug-
glers and refugees are persecuted.
This article suggests that this failure is in part a re-
sult of a misperception of the role of migrant smug-
glers: whereas governments predominantly treat them
as dangerous criminals enabling trafficking, the refugees
themselves perceive them as guides, advisors, and al-
lies. The latter perception—whether we like it or not—
must be acknowledged in any pragmatic anti-trafficking
policy aimed at aiding refugees. In addition to being ex-
ploitative, smugglers are crucial middle-men who shape
refugee outcomes where governments fail to do so. Be-
low I offer a description of smugglers’ understudied roles
in five areas and propose a “Targeted Advise” policy that
acknowledges these realities to decrease trafficking risk.
2. Literature Review
Scholars of forced migration have theorized the mod-
ern growth of a “‘migration industry’ consisting of smug-
glers, traffickers and other ‘illegal operators’” (Castles,
2003, p. 15). Against state-centered narratives—and
the proclaimed agendas of many national governments
themselves—they argued that repressive border man-
agement policies are a cause, not a consequence, of the
expansion of smuggling. “The growth in people traffick-
ing [in the post-Cold War period] is a result of the re-
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strictive immigration policies of rich countries” (Castles,
2003, p. 15). Gibney (2006) likewise points out that mi-
gratory risks through illegal channels have dramatically
increased in significance, bringing private middle-men
to the fore. Migratory decision-making has increasingly
been shifted from state representatives to “unaccount-
able actors [such as] smugglers and traffickers,” who
have been “empowered” by increasingly repressive bor-
der management since the 1980s (p. 143). This study ex-
plores the consequences of this empowerment.
The literature on forced migration has historically
reflected “an overwhelming tendency to focus on the
cause of refugee movements within the nation-state
rather than at a more systemic level” (Skran & Daughtry,
2007, p. 24). Migration research methods more broadly
have been criticized for treating the nation-state as “con-
tainer” (Faist, 2000) within which migratory decisions
are determined. Many approaches to the Syrian refugee
crisis have, furthermore, suffered from “methodological
nationalism” (Schiller, 2009) in failing to consider the
Balkan Route as a transnational entity. In the wake of Yu-
goslav disintegration, neoliberal reforms and regional EU
integration processes, the post-Cold War Balkan Route
has served as a dominant bridge for drug, arms and
other contraband entering Western Europe from Turkey.
Each Route nation serves as a critical bridge country for
transnational smuggling operations (see United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2015, and preceding yearly
reports). Given the coherence of the Balkan Route as a
rooted, historically-robust criminal grid for movement of
contraband, ideas, and people (Von Lampe, 2008), inves-
tigating the Syrian refugee wave in a single site (typically
a European destination country) is limiting.
Alternative approaches have emphasized transna-
tional processes (Portes, 2003; Vertovec, 2004; Wim-
mer & Schiller, 2003), including the smuggling of asylum-
seekers into Europe (Koser, 2007). Thoughmy five-nation
sample does not exhaust the sites that constitute the
transnational Balkan Route, it is a significant supplement
to single-country case-study approaches. By considering
common smuggling experiences, state responses to traf-
ficking, and border management policies across bridge
countries, I at least approximate systemic features of the
Balkan Route as a transnational social space.
Notoriously, migration management policies often
have counter-intuitive effects. Portes (1997) famously
applies Robert Merton’s approach to unintended con-
sequences of social action to theorize incoherent, and
sometimes counterproductive, unforced migration man-
agement (cf. Castles, 2003, p. 25). Scholars and policy-
makers alike have recognized that anti-smuggling poli-
cies are often futile symbolic gestures aimed at political
gain (Kyle & Koslowski, 2013; Triandafyllidou&Maroukis,
2012). With the rise of anti-migrant sentiment in Europe,
governments were increasingly under pressure to insti-
tute bombasticmeasures aimed not at desiredmigration
outcomes, but at perceived strength of anti-migrant com-
mitment. Unintended consequences have grown accord-
ingly: “the countries that complained themost about the
existence of border fences and walls, and vowed to bring
them down forever, are now busily constructing them”
(Park, 2015, p. 11).
On the Balkan Route—the dominant channel by
which the Middle Eastern migrant crisis spilt into
Europe—anti-trafficking policies were the pillar of migra-
tion management. Governments and international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs) have elevated the
challenge of refugee smuggling to the European level, G-
8 summits and United Nations (UN) conferences, warn-
ing that it threatens regional security and stability. In-
deed, “crackdown” on migrant smuggling has been the
defining posture of national governments affected by the
European refugee crisis (Albahari, 2015), and the core
of multinational efforts by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization) and Frontex to curb immigration (NATO,
2016). Both in rhetoric and policy, smugglers and traffick-
ers have been a preoccupation of governments during
this crisis.
On the Turkey-to-Greece segment of the Route, anti-
smuggler policies have generated considerable counter-
productive effects, including the well-known drownings
of 3,078 migrants in the Mediterranean by July 2016
(United Nations News Center, 2016). Indeed, research
has documented that thousands of drownings and near-
drownings were in effect caused by government res-
cue operations (Heller & Pezzani, 2016). By conflating
trafficking with smuggling, emphasizing seizure and de-
struction of smuggler vessels, andmilitarizing the Balkan
Route, European states and their partners have made
an already frail asylum system riskier for migrants (Euro-
pean Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2016).
Meanwhile, many Syrian forced migrants are denied
non-smuggler mechanisms for obtaining asylum-seeker
and refugee status. Formally, Balkan Route countries up-
hold international laws. Informally, there is growing con-
cern that the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, the European Convention on Human Rights, as
well as the European Schengen and Dublin Accords, were
regularly violated during the refugee crisis, both before
and after the EU–Turkey agreement (Maurer, personal
communication, 2016). The Common European Asylum
System has proven difficult to maintain, as it requires
migrants to be on the territory of the state in which
they wish to seek asylum while “EU law makes it virtu-
ally impossible to get to that country safely and legally”
(Costello, 2016, p. 12).
Castles, De Haas and Miller (2013) and Watters
(2013) have emphasized that meso-level agents such as
smugglers have been neglected in forced migration stud-
ies, including in the burgeoning literature on “ecomigra-
tion” (House, 2007; Reuveny, 2007). To make matters
worse, sex and forced labor trafficking is often conflated
with migrant smuggling (Paszkiewicz, 2015), though the
former is a relatively small subset in the refugee con-
text (International Labour Organization, 2012; Shelley,
2010). While human smuggling into western Europe and
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Germany is by no means a new phenomenon (Morrison
& Crosland, 2000; Neske, 2006), little is known about
when, how and why migrants find and decide to inter-
act with smugglers (for exceptions, see Bauer, 2016; In-
ternational Organization for Migration, 2015; Liempt &
Sersli, 2013).
Bottom-up qualitative investigations of the smuggler-
migrant relationship have been particularly rare. Partly
due to an unfortunate habit of the literature to mini-
mize or neglect refugee agency, investigations of Syrian
refugees rarely employ interview or survey instruments
with displaced Syrians themselves. Policies against smug-
glers are often designed with little empirical insight
into how trafficking devolves into smuggling, and what
motivates refugees to relate to smugglers as they do.
One study purportedly addressing “why migrants risk
their lives” via smuggling networks relies on no data
from the migrants themselves, inferring their motiva-
tions from government policies (Fargues & Bonfanti,
2014). This study is a corrective measure in this urgent
research field.
3. Methods
Qualitative data was drawn in 2015 and 2016 in five
countries, including destination countries Germany and
Jordan, as well as key Balkan Route transit countries
Turkey, Greece, and Serbia.1 Trained researchers con-
ducted in-depth interviews (1–4 hours, average of 1.5;
recorded and transcribed)with Syrian refugees (n = 123),
complementary quantifiable surveys (written) (n = 100)
and ethnographic observation at thirty-five refugee sites.
These sites included refugee camps such as Za’atari in
Jordan and Preševo in Serbia, as well as improvised mi-
grant settlements at border crossings. Smuggler-migrant
dynamics were the focus of ethnography in urban spaces
such as parks, piers, train and bus stations, public squares
and areas inhabited by migrants near camps.
At several sites—including Azraq Camp in Jordan
and Fluchtlingsunterkunft Borbecker Stase Camp in
Germany—we enjoyed rare access unavailable to most
investigators and journalists. Restricted access was
gained through the institutional support of a sponsor-
ing academic institution with ties to local Ministries and
NGOs. A notable obstacle to our original research de-
sign was the July 2016 attempted Turkish coup, which
aborted our access to camps and jeopardized the safety
of our researchers. Similar, lesser political events oc-
casionally prevented us from accessing certain sites,
or forced us to re-sample and seek out new chain-
referral informants.
The in-depth questionnaire and survey focused on
costs of migration, information sources, the subject’s
background, life in Syria, decision to leave Syria, arrival
and transit in foreign countries, perceptions of host pop-
ulations and governments, and migration methods with
emphasis on transactions, contact and relations with
smugglers. Themale/female ratio, age distribution (from
18 to 65), range of regional Syrian origins, socioeconomic
status and education levels were all reasonably balanced.
Political allegiances (predominantly anti-Assad) and eth-
nic background (disproportionately Kurdish Syrian) were
understandably tilted, given the differences between Syr-
ian IDPs and refugees. Interviewswere almost exclusively
conducted in Arabic either directly by a native or flu-
ent researcher or through an interpreter; the exceptions
were nine interviews conducted in English and another
two in German.
The shorter instrument of the survey—with closed-
ended items and scales—was administered and filled out
by the researchers, and was completed in 20–40 min-
utes, gathering data from individuals who were unavail-
able for the full hour required for in-depth interviewing.
Missing values on any given survey item never exceeded
12% of the sample. No two respondents were drawn
from the same traveling unit or nuclear family, and none
overlapped with the in-depth sample. The survey was in-
tended to complement in-depth interviews with precise
quantifiable estimates of such things as smuggler prices,
length of migration and other information that would
require too much interruption and elicitation during in-
depth conversations.
While ethnographic observation was modeled on Al-
lan’s (2013) anthropology of Palestinian refugee camps,
in-depth interviewing was designed following Hagan’s
(2008) conversations with irregular migrants across
the US–Mexico border. Interview data was extracted
through content analysis of transcripts to document the
following: failed attempts at border crossings and migra-
tion via smugglers; positive, neutral and negative evalua-
tions of smugglers; indications of reliance on smugglers
for anything other than smuggling—including informa-
tion, protection, childcare, social capital, emotional sup-
port, advice and entertainment; all instances of other
Syrians recommending, advising against, or evaluating
smugglers; mentions of smuggler-government collabo-
ration, witnessed or perceived; and indications of traf-
ficking, as defined above. Positive, negative, and neu-
tral evaluations of all smugglers and other “middle-men”
was compared throughout. Ethnographic observation
of the subject’s environment often led to secondary
“coding by ear” of the audio recordings to supplement
the transcripts.
The research team consisted of six fieldworkers and
the author, who was Principal Investigator. Researchers
underwent extensive training on interview-based and
ethnographic methods, and on interacting with sensi-
tive and traumatized populations. Interviewees were
sampled—with informants’ and experts’ assistance—to
diversify age, gender, socioeconomic status, traveling
unit size, migration route, length of residence in coun-
try, and regional Syrian origin. Experts and informants
1 Full methodological appendix available upon request, including sampling strategy, country subsample differences, list of sites and informants, response
rates, exact dates, and limitations.
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included government officials, NGO or INGO workers,
camp volunteers, and residents. Anonymity and confi-
dentiality were guaranteed in written consent forms,
and debriefing carefully invited requests for deletions by
the subjects.
4. Results: Smugglers as Guides, Informants, and Allies
Following convention (Aronowitz, 2001; Iselin & Adams,
2003), I differentiate between smugglers—those facili-
tating or seeking to facilitate illegal border crossings—
and traffickers—who threatened or employed coercion
and/or deception towards migrants. Intra-national traf-
ficking is of course possible, but outside the scope of this
study. For present purposes, I treat trafficking (i.e., inter-
national) as a subset of migrant smuggling. In our data,
cases of smuggling devolving into trafficking were fortu-
itously clear because questionnaires explicitly inquired
about “anything” being arranged or done by the smug-
gler “without your consent” and “without your knowl-
edge.” Thus, when migrants experienced any exploita-
tion (labor or otherwise), or any coercive (including non-
violent) or deceptive (including for the migrants’ alleged
self-interest) behavior on the part of the smuggler, this
was operationalized as trafficking. Survey items also in-
quired directly about labor exploitation, violence, choice,
and threat—as further cross-validation.
A central finding is that the overwhelming major-
ity of the subjects (∼75%) did not report trafficking
experiences:
• only 7.9% of the sample reported being asked to
engage in labor at any point during migration;
• 26.8% of the sample reported experiencing decep-
tion at the hands of smugglers (compared to 36.6%
who reported deception by soldiers, policemen or
other state officials);
• 12.2% reported involuntary family separations
causedby smugglers (compared to 17.6%whoexpe-
rienced the same caused by government officials).
More generally, the “horror film” stories (as a young re-
spondent memorably put it) about government officials’
behaviors—both witnessed and anticipated—made re-
ported problems with smugglers appear minor and infre-
quent. Statements of positive evaluations of smugglers
(e.g., “They saved us,” or “I owe him my life”) numbered
in the dozens across the sample. Comparable statements
about any government or relief agencies (“They give us
clothes, food,” or “They were good to us at the Camp”)
were noted a handful of times. This is especially striking
given the settings of most interviews.
The subset of trafficking experiences, furthermore,
consisted mainly of relatively noncoercive and nonvio-
lent violations of trust: minor theft, pursuit of unagreed-
upon migration routes, changing dates of departure and
arrival to avoid law-enforcement, exaggerating the com-
fort of the means of transportation, threatening (with-
out realization) to cancel travel arrangements mid-way,
lying about life vests, and underestimating number of
co-travelers. Exceptions were rare: two respondents re-
ported being threatened by a smuggler with a deadly
weapon; and one indicated (albeit ambiguously) that
smugglers kidnapped her daughter. Overall, however,
even a conservative operationalization of deception and
coercion led to the conclusion thatmost of the smugglers
did not engage in any prolonged social relationship be-
yond the voluntary exchange of money for services.
Below I explore six features of the refugee-smuggler
relationship, suggesting that intelligent analysis and re-
sulting policymust carefully differentiate traffickers from
smugglers in each domain. I conclude with a policy rec-
ommendation for a targeted advice campaign to de-
crease risk of trafficking.
For brevity, each section merely summarizes over-
all trends and illustrates with ideal-typical examples. All
data is from interview transcripts, surveys or ethno-
graphic fieldnotes, unless otherwise noted.
4.1. Trust
Positive evaluations of smugglers permeated the in-
terviews. Subjects overwhelmingly expressed favorable
views of smugglers and their handling of the migration;
solidarity was often formulated in religious, ethnic, and
even familial terms. Strikingly, one woman who nearly
died because of her trafficker’s negligence (“My job is to
put you on the boat,” he cynically told her on the phone
during a near-death experience he caused, “If you drown,
this is up to Allah”), nevertheless maintained a sympa-
thy towards him that is thoroughly typical throughout
the sample:
Smuggler for us was very good. I know this smuggler
is working in illegal way, but he help us. They help
us. Maybe they took some money, but the problem
is that they are afraid….He is like us. I don’t blame
him….This smuggler is our friend, our friend.
On a five-point scale of satisfaction with their smug-
gler, 73.7% of survey respondents gave the highest score
(“very satisfied”) to their criminal ally, with several in-
dicating “10” to emphasize their gratitude. Only 16.4%
were either “dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied,” of whom
several clarified that they were referring to only one
smuggler experience (i.e. one leg of the journey), to be
differentiated from the main smugglers. Refugees were
overall unambiguously opposed to policies targeting traf-
fickers, which they (understandably) perceived as target-
ing Syrian refugees.
4.2. Access
Subjects primarily found smugglers at public places such
as parks, bus/train stations and ports in transit countries
(47%) or through a recommendation by Syrian friends
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and family or other migrants (33%). The overwhelm-
ing majority of word-of-mouth recommendations were
ethnic- or kinship-based and reliable. Only 12% of sur-
vey respondents indicated that the smuggler found them,
and—crucially—those subjects were more likely to ex-
perience trafficking. Interview respondents who recalled
recommendations for smugglers mostly relied on advice
from Syrians in their immediate vicinity, secondarily on
recommendations from their predecessors who traveled
the Balkan Route months or years before them.
Much has been made of the importance of social
media in the refugee crisis (Gillespie et al., 2016). It is
certainly true that Internet access and cellular phone
chargers have empowered subjects to study route maps,
to keep in touch with contacts at destination countries,
and to learn of incidents at borders and camps. On the
whole, cell phones have allowed greater adaptability and
quicker reaction to changes in border management. But
this conceals an equally-important datum: online infor-
mation about traffickers hardly matters at all. Not a sin-
gle respondent identified the Internet as a means of
finding a smuggler. This migration decision—arguably
the most consequential—is decidedly done offline. Thus,
measures targeting traffickers online may not be the
ideal priority.
4.3. Costs
Smugglers were by far the greatest relative cost of mi-
gration (Table 1). Survey respondents indicated a mean
of 954.96 Euros given to smugglers per individual (with
or without families). Among those not traveling alone,
half the sample gave on average less than 1,000 Euros
for their family, 38.1% gave between 1,000–5,000 Eu-
ros, and 11.9% more than 5,000 Euros (see Figures 1–2).
The uppermost reported cost per 16-person traveling
unit was as high as 35,600 Euros, while the maximal
reported cost per person was 4,000 Euros for a jour-
ney from Turkey to Serbia. Disaggregating the average
costs per individual per segment of journey (i.e., a sin-
gle smuggling trip, as opposed to multiple trips by dif-
ferent smugglers or by different transportation means),
we see costs increase significantly as refugees get farther
to their destination countries. Among those going to Eu-
rope (i.e., excluding the Jordan sub-sample), 54% pay be-
tween 1–1,000 Euros per person per segment of journey;
25% pay 1,000–2,000; and 21% pay 2,000–4,000.
8%
33%
12%
47%
Figure 1. Means of finding smuggler. Note: Means re-
sponses also included “Internet,” which 0 respondents
selected; “Other” included fill-in-the-blank option: an-
swers included “By luck,” “By chance,” “Accidentally.”).
1–1,000 Euros
1,000–3,000 Euros
3,000–5,000 Euros
> 5,000 Euros
50%
12%
17%
21%
Figure 2. Average smuggling cost per family. Note:
Means responses also included “Internet,” which 0
respondents selected; “Other” included fill-in-the-
blank option: answers included “By luck,” “By chance,”
“Accidentally.”
Table 1. Relative migration costs.
Most Common Smuggler + Smuggler + Smuggler + All Other
Rankings Buses/trains/taxis Buses/trains/taxis Theft/loss of Ranking
+ Food money/resources Orders
Percentage of Respondents 25.5% 17.6% 13.9% 53%
#1 Most Costly #2 Most Costly #3 Most Costly
Smugglers 76.5% 15.9% 12.0%
Buses/Trains/Taxis 21.6% 51.0% 12.0%
Food 12.0% 11.8% 23.6%
Theft/Loss of Money/Resources 12.0% 17.9% 17.9%
Medicine/Doctors 10 13.9% 15.9%
Lodging/Shelter 13.9% 10 10
Notes: Additional response format categories “Clothing,” “Government Fees, Forced Payments,” and “Money/resources for fam-
ily/friends other than migration companions” yielded zero responses. Respondents indicated whether they were major expenses or
not, then ranked the top three. Expense category orderings were randomized so that five sets of 15 survey questionnaires had this item
with 15 different answer orderings.
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Among the refugees who journeyed into Europe, the
financial burdenof traveling in a family groupwas greater
than traveling alone or with strangers. Traveling with
children under 18 or the elderly (over 65) resulted in a
higher total cost per family unit. Approximately 75% of
respondents in the highest quartile of reported travel
costs—that is, three-quarters of those who spent the
most money to reach Europe—were traveling with de-
pendents. Asmay be expected, refugees travelingwith as
many as seven or eight family members paid more over-
all than refugees traveling alone.
Finally, the interview subjects who traveled before
the March 2016 closing of the Balkan Route apparently
paid up to 500 Euros less than their peers who traversed
similar paths after the EU–Turkey agreement. Subjects
migrating prior to the closing of the Route paid a mean
1,000 Euros for the boat ride (children were uncharged);
a few reported paying 600. The mean per leg of jour-
ney (i.e., per single smuggling segment between two
points) increased on average 33% after the Route closing.
The data clearly suggests that anti-smuggler repression
simply made smuggling more lucrative. With increased
anti-smuggler crackdowns, the boat ride to Europe and
the preconditions for it became much riskier—making
the entire journey more perilous and expensive. Put dif-
ferently, smugglers were asked to accomplish a trickier
feat; and—from the refugee’s perspective—smugglers
became more inaccessible and costly.
Consequently, refugee narratives about labor-based
trafficking were much more common among those trav-
eling in the post-closure period. Not a single respon-
dent traveling before March 2016 reported trafficking
experiences. In contrast, seven reported being offered
to work for a trafficker to pay off debt when traveling
after the Route closure. Discussed jobs included hair-
dressing, restaurant serving, construction work, translat-
ing and recruiting customers for the voyage. One sub-
ject understood the steep price, noting: “They also have
to pay the police. The police are also customers for
the smugglers.”
4.4. Shelter and Care
Counterintuitively, many subjects appeared to have en-
joyed a comprehensive, all-inclusive service from their
criminal providerswithout experiencing trafficking. They
relied on a single smuggler’s network of shelter for the
full journey from Turkey to Serbia and even Germany.
Various safe houses along the way were included in the
service—even, occasionally, medical care. Residents and
experts in bridge countries readily listed various crimi-
nal sites (motels, private houses, outdoor garages, camp-
sites) reportedly used as illicit safe houses for refugees.
A local motel/inn where the author resided during field-
work was one such safe house.
While other subjects slept in public parks for weeks,
waiting for their smuggler contact or a new criminal re-
cruiter to approach them with directions for moving on,
the ones in smuggler safe houses were ironically better
protected from harsh weather, violence by hostile locals,
and—arguably—traffickers.
Subjects even described a criminal health care ar-
rangement (though it sounded exceptional). One refugee
was quite satisfied with his: “[Smuggler] was good. He
had organization. He took care of everything. Full ser-
vice, everything organized, doctors organized, doctors in-
cluded in the price. He was very good.”
Though this is by no means common, it is strik-
ing to contrast with the considerable skepticism about
state-sponsored medical resources, including at camps.
Far from exaggerating an illness to expedite the trip
to Germany, many refugees seemed instead to hide it.
Scarred by war-related interrogations in Turkey, Syrians
feared that revealing any weakness would jeopardize
their movement:
Q. Did you go see the doctors here?
A1. No, no. No thank you. They will say you are sick,
goodbye. I am healthy, I am educated, I will be no
problem in Europe.
A2. Yes, my daughter had a cold. They were very good.
She got medicaments, she is better now. But you
know, we don’t trust doctors. The doctors in [Turk-
ish camp] ask how did you get this injury? Are you for
the revolution or for Assad? And then you are finished.
You will never leave.
But officials hardly shared this worldview. Well-aware of
the elaborate network of criminal hiding and sheltering,
border patrolmen, policemen, soldiers, and camp guards
were on the lookout in all five countries, particularly Jor-
dan, Turkey, and Serbia. One policeman confessed that
the first danger he is worried about is “terrorists and lu-
natics.” The second: “traffickers” who are infiltrating the
Camp to recruit customers. Whenever he sees anybody
moving around between traveling groups on site, “I send
the translator to listen.” At the outer gates of his Camp,
where migrants waited to board buses, watchful guards
chased any potential recruiters, drivers, or motel adver-
tisers away. Comparable measures in effect fail to differ-
entiate between smugglers (whomay in fact be reducing
risk) from predatory traffickers.
4.5. Trailblazers, Expectations, and Smuggler
Adaptation
Cumulative causation and the role of networks in mi-
gratory outcomes is a staple of the migration literature
(Fussell & Massey, 2004), apparent also in Syrian migra-
tion in this study. A sizable minority of in-depth sub-
jects were not pioneer migrants: they are following their
family members, friends or countrymen who acted as
trailblazers on the Balkan Route. These informants pro-
vided encouragement, expectations, suggestions, and
smuggler introductions. Such “chain migration” is a fa-
miliar phenomenon (Palloni, Massey, Ceballos, Espinosa,
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& Spittel, 2001), but primarily in conditions of economic
migration and consistency in border management.
Syrian refugees encountered nothing of the sort. The
advice given to them by their predecessors related to
the Balkan Route of six-to-thirty months before their
own journeys. Information onwhich borders to cross and
how, what smuggler prices and services to expect, how
many people to travel with, where to sleep, and how to
navigate camps, was often outdated.
A consequence of such misleading expectations was
increased risk of being trafficked, as smugglers increas-
ingly engaged in deception when describing and offering
transportation. Many crossed the Mediterranean with
false information from their trafficker about how many
people would be on board, and whether there would be
a pilot. This was a substantive change from the trailblazer
experience:
Q. How was your father’s journey, his travel, com-
pared to yours?
A. …He have no problems in the sea. Safe.
But…we…we had swimming time. My sister fall in
water. She fall in…cold water, as ice. You know, so
it was bad situation. We have problem keeping her
warm, we garbage her shoes, her clotheses. [shaking
head]. So, she had swimming time because they let
us go alone. My father had a pilot.
Another elderly female subject complained about her
trailblazer’s advice because it made it sound “easier than
it was.”
Relatedly, there is evidence for the decline of “One
Stop Shop” smuggling. Namely, whereas the trailblazers
reportedly relied on a single criminal organization, their
followers encountered a Route that is inhospitable to
this possibility.
Q. How did you find [the Turkish smuggler]?
A. Through word-of-mouth. My friends [who left a
year earlier] told me. He was recommended. It was
for the full travel, from Turkey to Germany. He had
drivers for them [in every country]….We thought he
would be good.
Q. But things have changed.
A. He didn’t call us for three weeks after we gave him
the money! [imitating] Don’t worry, tomorrow. He
said in Greece his partner will wait for us, and noth-
ing. Bandits! That’s why today people use six, seven,
eight smugglers for the full travel. You need to start
again, each contact.
Naturally, each new arrival and border-crossing requires
migrants to search for new smugglers, exposing them re-
peatedly to new trafficking arrangements.
More generally, when a set of embarkation and dis-
embarkation points are efficiently used by the smugglers,
their experience in transporting their clients guarantees
a certain degree of certainty and predictability. When
government controls at these points intensify, the smug-
glers adapt by pursuing other routes to avoid capture.
Given their inexperience and ignorance of the new paths,
these new routes tend to be longer and more danger-
ous for the migrants. Hence many subjects paid dearly—
not just in money but in physical health—for smuggler
adaptations to state crackdowns. Some became victims
of trafficking.
Almost all the interviewees (116/123) reported re-
peated failures at crossing borders—ranging from three
to a record thirteen. Dozens were arrested or detained
against their will for attempted crossings. Thirty-four sub-
jects were arrested or detained repeatedly in Lebanon,
Turkey, Greece,Macedonia or within Syria itself, trying to
cross borders. Most subjects who passed through Turkey
repeatedly failed to get to Greece the first time around.
A typical failure resulted in fingerprinting, detention, or
deportation to Syria. One subject was separated from
her 17-year old son, reunited only six days later. An-
other woman survived several days of “walking in the
mountains from Latakia to Turkey” on foot from Syria
(some sixty km of hostile terrain), not too far from inten-
sive battles.
Other serious risks to life, health, safety, and in-
tegrity of the travel unit were commonplace. These risks
primarily came from soldiers, policemen, guards, and
other state representatives. Secondarily, they came from
smugglers adapting to state crackdown by abandoning
their clients.
A. He [the smuggler] was complaining.
Q. What did he say?
A. He said business is bad. People don’t have money.
Police are stronger. He said before, he could not keep
up with all the customers. [imitating smuggler] Thou-
sands every day, not enough boats! With us, he said
he needed. He also used cheap boats now. Because
he loses them.
Another consequence of criminal adaptations relates to
documents. Many Syrian refugees have no documents
to begin with. A Camp Coordinator in Preševo estimated
that less than 10% of Syrian refugees arrived with pass-
ports. Syrians in particular, especially the ones who had
been politically exposed as anti-Assad, risk being labeled
traitors for wanting to leave the country. “They ask for
my passport,” a former combatant said incredulously,
“Getting a passport is a death sentence.” Others, how-
ever, gave their documents to the smugglers as collateral:
“[I have] no passport. Mywife has passport, my childrens.
Smugglerwanted passport, I givemy passport. If you give
them document, you are priority.”
4.6. Smugglers as Informants
Given the inconsistency of border management across
the Route, refugees are often obstructed from effec-
tively avoiding risk, planning safe travel and interacting
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with smugglers in a transparent, relatively safe way. Con-
sequently, subjects became more dependent on smug-
glers who promised to reduce uncertainty about how
and when to cross borders. Dozens upon dozens of risky
border-crossings, within-country movements between
camps or sites, and voluntary separations or mergers
with other traveling groups were done directly because
of smuggler advice.
Interviewees sometimes reported not being certain
of which country they are currently in, let alone national,
linguistic, and other nuances. They rarely if ever knew
the difference between EU and non-EU states, where
Schengen ends, or what the relevant territorial jurisdic-
tions are. In such circumstances, smuggler information
(and its associated offers) ironically appeared to be a
stable basis for deciding. As dependence on smugglers
for advice increases, the potential for trafficking natu-
rally follows.
Dependence on smugglers for information is exacer-
bated by belief in the corruption of state organs. “Who
can trust them?” asked one subject in Greece. “They
want just to arrest us,” suggested another in Germany.
This perception is not restricted to themigrants.Multiple
expert interviewees—including a Secret Service profes-
sional who interrogated traffickers deported backward
along the Route, a seasoned UNHCR fieldworker, and
two government officials in Ministries dealing with bor-
der controls—reported that elements of the police, army
and government were integral to smuggler operations.
One UNHCR expert went even suggested that corrupt po-
lice elements prefer to arrest innocent refugees on false
charges of smuggling (as indeed happen to a man in the
Greece subsample) than to arrest known criminals who
bribe policemen.
Finally, smugglers enjoy such a privileged posi-
tion as information-providers because governments and
refugee aid managers diligently avoid topics of illegal
border crossings. Fieldwork revealed that bridge coun-
try refugee camps, transit centers, humanitarian sites
and other government-regulated sites emphasize only a
narrow selection of information through their material
and staff. Typically, the scope is restricted to legalistic
and security matters (asylum procedures, national laws)
and humanitarian procedures governing the sites (food,
clothing, shelter). Daily tasks of camp workers rarely al-
low for private, secure information exchange that grants
migrants honesty without fear of penalty. Staff commu-
nicating verbally with migrants focus on their immedi-
ate duties, rarely discussing the migrants’ lives outside
the immediate jurisdiction of the site or camp. Pam-
phlets, posters, signs, maps, and Wi-Fi hotspot home-
pages present thousands of words—sometimes in a
dozen languages and dialects—of obscure legal verses on
asylum law. Refugees are barraged by information they
neither need nor understand.
Concurrently, information about smuggling is consis-
tently avoided. Representatives conducting face-to-face
informing typically ignore smuggling as a phenomenon
for fear of jeopardizing their jobs. The Syrians, natu-
rally, reciprocate in avoiding the topic for fear of com-
promising their legal status or access to goods or privi-
leges. Mid- and low-level informers, such as interpreters,
guides, aid volunteers, coordinators and (above all) secu-
rity staff consider the phenomenon a taboo subject, or
irrelevant to their work. Specialized informers—such as
medical doctors and legal advisors—carefully evade the
issue when talking to migrants to avoid responsibility for
unsound advice. Many NGO-run sites studiously refuse
to acknowledge that smugglers exist—sometimes hun-
dreds of meters away from the checkpoint at hand. Oth-
ers only mention trafficking to deter with grim warnings
to migrants not to associate with them.
The findings suggest that this approach is counter-
productive. The sampled subjects typically did not care
about information given to themby governments and aid
staff. Instead, they favored information from each other
and—vitally—from smugglers. Rumors about smugglers
is decidedly the most important category of information
to the migrants themselves. They will pursue it with or
without official guidance. Refugees care naught to read
obscure passages about their legal rights. They prefer to
engage with smugglers despite warnings, with the full
knowledge of the trafficking risk they take. Posters on
reporting human trafficking pervades refugee sites; yet
nothing is communicated about who and where these
traffickers are. Information that could save a refugee fam-
ilies’ health and lives is frequently withheld fromwritten
material for fear of endorsing or encouraging criminals.
5. Conclusions: Targeted Advice Policy
Recommendation
From mid-2014 onward, and especially since March
2016, Balkan Route countries have implemented border
militarization unprecedented since World War II. At sea,
Coast and Border Guards are coupledwith Greek, Turkish
and international military. On land, massive fences and
walls, surveillance cameras, and interrogation facilities
supplement police and military units deploying rubber
bullets, batons, watch dogs and teargas. Most of these
policies—ill-advisedly, I have suggested—do not differen-
tiate between persecution of smugglers and traffickers.2
I have suggested that the Syrian refugees’ smug-
gling experience overwhelmingly did not include traffick-
ing. The evidence surveyed sheds light on six aspects of
the smuggler-migrant relation. First, migrants trust and
identity with smugglers, expressing considerable satis-
faction with their criminal services. Second, social cap-
ital through family and kinship/ethnic ties secured ac-
cess to smugglers; the refugees mostly sought out the
2 At certain phases of the Syrian refugee wave, European policymakers acknowledged that smugglers are not the root cause of the problem, allowing
for more precise targeting of traffickers. Notably, the transition from operation Mare Nostrum to the Frontex Plus/Triton in 2013–2014 resulted in the
arrest of hundreds of traffickers and balanced rescuemissions with selective persecution efforts. This encouraging step has, however, been exceptional.
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smugglers, not the other way around. Third, while aver-
age smuggling costs varied along travel unit size, distance
traveled, etc., anti-smuggler repression drove costs up
and trafficking was more common for those traveling
after the Balkan Route closure than for those traveling
before. Fourth, smugglers were often providers of shel-
ter and care, including sometimes medical care that was
superior to—and more trusted than—government alter-
natives. Fifth, the refugees relied on trailblazer informa-
tion that had become outdated and nullified by smug-
gler adaptation to state repression. Sixth, the smugglers
served as precious informants for critical decisions the
migrants took, routinely against competing government
and NGO guidance.
What can be done? As indicated, current efforts at
information dissemination to refugees offer a narrow
scope of information, systematically ignore the topic
of trafficking and smuggling, and engage in futile at-
tempts at deterrence. Information aimed at disincen-
tivizing refugees from employing smugglers—whether
by withholding information or frightening them—simply
does notwork. The question is notwhether theywill take
risks through smuggling channels. Rather, it is whether
they will take informed or uninformed risk. It is here that
policymakers can improve outcomes.
When it comes to decisions exposing them to traf-
ficking risks, Syrian refugees rely almost exclusively on
information from social capital: their trailblazer family
members who traveled the Route months earlier, other
migrants at the site, and local smugglers and recruiters
in public areas. As governments refuse to communicate
about smuggling with refugees except when persecut-
ing them, Syrians in turn studiously avoid asking any in-
formed representative, government or civilian, about the
migrant smuggler market. The information that leads to
their choosing a particular smuggler, a time of migra-
tion, a transportation method, and a border crossing is
almost never guided by intelligent policy. Consequently,
these choices are often ill-advised. They put refugees
in physical danger of injury and death, in legal dangers
of arrest and deportation, and at risk of becoming prey
to traffickers.
A more effective policy should aim at targeted ad-
vice about smugglers, delivered to refugees directly, hon-
estly and with transparent opportunities for migrants to
inquire without fear of penalty. Clear, updated informa-
tion about the local smuggling—and hence trafficking—
landscape can fruitfully be shared in two areas:
— Smuggler organizations, recruitment sites, and
reputations. Relying on advice from other Syrians,
and especially from the smuggling network from
the preceding bridge country, denies refugees crit-
ical information on alternative smuggling groups,
where to reach them, and how to assess them.
Typically, no single smuggling operation occupies
the market. Rather, one smuggling group may
be known to authorities for its use of coercion
and deception, its handling of unaccompanied mi-
nors, and its engagement in trafficking. Another—
equally illegal—may be known to authorities for
its nonviolent operation, its relatively reliable ser-
vice, and its reluctance to cross the line into traf-
ficking. Analogously, some public spaces—parks,
ports, bus/train stations—are known to be safer
recruiting grounds than others. Police in Greece,
Serbia and Turkey gather such information rou-
tinely. Other security organs already have infor-
mants’ networks among smugglers, regularly up-
dating intelligence. In sharing selections of it with
migrants, they not only deter refugees from reck-
less risk-taking out of ignorance; they also ob-
struct the more egregious trafficking operations
that they otherwise fail to dismantle.
— Border crossing risk comparisons and alternative
options. Even the most educated, economically
well-off respondents had limited knowledge of
bridge country geography, border crossings, or the
nature of neighboring countries’ regimes. Having
left the Middle East and Turkey, respondents had
no idea, for instance, that Greece and Macedo-
nia have dueling border patrols that make cer-
tain crossings bloodier and deadlier than others;
or that the Hungarian border with Serbia is the
most militarized in Europe, whereas the Croatian
alternative is more porous and unlikely to end
in beatings, teargas and attack dogs; or that cer-
tain periods of the month—when trucking vol-
ume is high, or when bribed customs officers
are on shift—are more hospitable to safe smug-
gling than others. Knowing these and other facts
can mean the difference between asylum and de-
portation, forced detention and hospitalization,
life and death. Policy should aim at clear, visual
representations—through maps and figures—of il-
legal border crossing options and their relative
risks. Currently, it is smugglers and traffickers who
are de facto informants in this area. Their advice is
hardly disinterested.
— Smuggling prices. Full standardization and trans-
parency in smuggling service costs is impossible.
But a meaningful step in that direction would
be to publicize and regularly update street prices
for smuggler services throughout the country—
modeled on Taxi tariffs for specified distances
and routes. This is particularly salient for bridge
countries. Most governments have excellent es-
timates of smuggling prices; and even modest
ethnographic excursions can help revise price fluc-
tuations. Refugees waste precious resources on
moving within a bridge country to reach suppos-
edly cheaper smuggling routes, only to be disillu-
sioned. Others discover that haggling produces sig-
nificant price differences between their family and
their traveling companions. Some suffer deception
and local currency manipulations. Many fall prey
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to traffickers. Quality, public information on prices
would be an elegant and effective intervention to
improve matters.
Information aimed at deterrence is largely ineffective,
while targeted advice on smugglers canproducedirect re-
ductions in trafficking risk. Legalistic material is unpopu-
lar and largely inconsequential to Syrian refugees. In con-
trast, any of the above information—which law enforce-
ment largely possess already—would be treasured and
acted on. Finally, such transparent guidance would help
refugees take informed, safer risks, thereby reducing the
immense government costs of ignorant risk-taking: hos-
pitalization, hunger, restlessness, and violent assault.
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